As a rule, the negligence of the counsel is considered as the negligence of the client. However, in several case the Supreme Court admitted exceptions to the general rule, to wit:
1. the client is deprived of due process
2. application of the general rule will result in outright deprivation of clients liberty or property
3. where the interest of justice so requires, and accord relief to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyers gross negligence.
It must be noted that the exceptions were applied on a case to case basis, depending on the factual circumstances which surrounded the respective client’s milieu.
In the following cases, the SC applied the exceptions:
A. APEX MINING, INC., ENGR. PANFILO FRIAS and ENGR. REY DIONISIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO CASIA, as Judge of Branch 2, Tagum, Davao del Norte, MIGUEL BAGAIPO, ALFREDO ROA, EDGAR BARERA, BONIFACIO BARIUS, JR., FRANCISCO BELLO and LEOPOLDO CAGATIN, respondents. G.R. No. 133750 November 29, 1999
The instant case falls within the exception. Petitioners' counsel is in guilty of gross negligence in handling their case before the trial court. Records show that petitioners' former counsel did not attend the scheduled hearing for the reception of the evidence for the defense despite due notice. The law firm did not even bother to inform its client of the scheduled hearing, as a result of which both counsel and petitioners were unable to attend the same. Worse, after the trial court issued an order declaring defendants [petitioners herein] as having waived their right to present evidence, their counsel did not take steps to have the same set aside. Although after a decision against APEX was rendered by the trial court, petitioners' counsel was able to file a timely notice of appeal. However, it failed to pay the docket fee and refused to do so despite repeated notice to pay was given by the Court of Appeals, by reason of which the appeal was dismissed. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that no action was taken by the counsel on the said dismissal, thereby allowing it to become final and executory.
Petitioners cannot be faulted in not inquiring into the records and status of the case. They expected that their counsel would amply protect their interest since they were their retained counsel which handled a majority, if not all of the cases of petitioners, including the case subject of this petition.
A client may reasonably expect that his counsel will make good his representations and has the right to expect that his lawyer will protect his interests during the trial of his case. For the general employment of an attorney to prosecute or defend a case or proceeding ordinarily vests in a plaintiff's attorney the implied authority to take all steps or do all acts necessary or incidental to the regular and orderly prosecution and management of the suit, and in a defendant's attorney, the power to take such steps as he deems necessary to defend the suit and protect the interests of the defendant.
Further, there is ample showing that petitioners' previous counsel misrepresented to the former about the true status of the damage suit filed by herein private respondents. They were made to believe, per the Progress Report submitted by the said Law Firm, that Civil Case 2131 was still pending on appeal with the Court of Appeals when in truth, the appeal has already been dismissed sixteen months ago.
The foregoing incompetence or negligence of petitioners' counsel is so great which prevented them from fairly presenting their defense as interposed in the answer that they could not be liable for damages, considering that the plaintiffs' tunnel was constructed within the claim area of the petitioners without permission, and that the award of P72,000 a day by the trial court is excessive and without basis since the tunnel's daily production was of low grade ore and was practically nil due to the hardness of the vein materials and excessive flow of water aggravated by the withdrawal of plaintiff's financier of his generator and water pumps.
If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to present his case. Similarly, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case as a result of his lawyer's professional delinquency or infidelity the litigation may be reopened to allow the party to present his side. Where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground.
B. VICTORIA G. CALLANGAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,* Respondent. G.R. No. 153414 June 27, 2006
The rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client admits of exceptions. The recognized exceptions are: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property or (3) where the interests of justice so require.4 In such cases, courts must step in and accord relief to a party-litigant.5
The omissions of petitioner’s counsel amounted to an abandonment or total disregard of her case. They show conscious indifference to or utter disregard of the possible repercussions to his client. Thus, the chronic inaction of petitioner’s counsel on important incidents and stages of the criminal proceedings constituted gross negligence.
The RTC itself found that petitioner never had the chance to present her defense because of the nonfeasance (malfeasance, even) of her counsel. It also concluded that, effectively, she was without counsel.6 Considering these findings, to deprive petitioner of her liberty without affording her the right to be assisted by counsel is to deny her due process.
In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is immutable.7 Otherwise, there will be a grave denial of due process.8 The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned.9
In People v. Ferrer,10 the essence of the right to counsel was enunciated:
The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.11 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by a counsel who did not devote himself to the defense of her cause. Counsel’s utter lack of action after the prosecution rested its case revealed an extreme shortcoming on his part. Such inaction definitely proved infidelity to and abandonment of petitioner’s cause.
Considering that this case involved personal liberty, the gross negligence of counsel shocks our sense of justice. It should not be allowed to prejudice petitioner’s constitutional right to be heard.12 The Court’s pronouncement in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,13 applies strongly in this case:
The judicial conscience certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution just because the presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality. Rigid application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice where justice is due – to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime with which he or she might be charged.14
C. VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC., THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94, respondents. G.R. No. 94457 March 18, 1991
Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to exercise his utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause. 13 It is not only a case of simple negligence as found by the appellate court, but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that his client was deprived of her property without due process of law.
In People's Homesite & Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco and Escasa, 14 this Court ruled as follows:
Procedural technicality should not be made a bar to the vindication of a legitimate grievance. When such technicality deserts from being an aid to justice, the courts are justified in excepting from its operation a particular case. Where there was something fishy and suspicious about the actuations of the former counsel of petitioner in the case at bar, in that he did not given any significance at all to the processes of the court, which has proven prejudicial to the rights of said clients, under a lame and flimsy explanation that the court's processes just escaped his attention, it is held that said lawyer deprived his clients of their day in court, thus entitling said clients to petition for relief from judgment despite the lapse of the reglementary period for filing said period for filing said petition.
In Escudero vs. Judge Dulay, 15 this Court, in holding that the counsel's blunder in procedure is an exception to the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes of counsel, made the following disquisition:
Petitioners contend, through their new counsel, that the judgments rendered against them by the respondent court are null and void, because they were therein deprived of their day in court and divested of their property without due process of law, through the gross ignorance, mistake and negligence of their previous counsel. They acknowledge that, while as a rule, clients are bound by the mistake of their counsel, the rule should not be applied automatically to their case, as their trial counsel's blunder in procedure and gross ignorance of existing jurisprudence changed their cause of action and violated their substantial rights.
We are impressed with petitioner's contentions.
Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or cure for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari (appeal) under Rule 45 of the Rules. Where, however, the application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may be relaxed.
xxx xxx xxx
While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client will suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice and equity, exceptions may be made to such rule, in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case. Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant case, result in the outright deprivation of their property through a technicality.
In its questioned decision dated November 19, 1989 the Court of Appeals found, in no uncertain terms, the negligence of the then counsel for petitioner when he failed to file the proper motion to dismiss or to draw a compromise agreement if it was true that they agreed on a settlement of the case; or in simply filing an answer; and that after having been furnished a copy of the decision by the court he failed to appeal therefrom or to file a petition for relief from the order declaring petitioner in default. In all these instances the appellate court found said counsel negligent but his acts were held to bind his client, petitioner herein, nevertheless.
The Court disagrees and finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross and inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel another chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment of the judgment in the appellate court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that after he received a copy of the adverse judgment of the appellate court, he did not do anything to save the situation or inform his client of the judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and become final. Such reckless and gross negligence should not be allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.
1. the client is deprived of due process
2. application of the general rule will result in outright deprivation of clients liberty or property
3. where the interest of justice so requires, and accord relief to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyers gross negligence.
It must be noted that the exceptions were applied on a case to case basis, depending on the factual circumstances which surrounded the respective client’s milieu.
In the following cases, the SC applied the exceptions:
A. APEX MINING, INC., ENGR. PANFILO FRIAS and ENGR. REY DIONISIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO CASIA, as Judge of Branch 2, Tagum, Davao del Norte, MIGUEL BAGAIPO, ALFREDO ROA, EDGAR BARERA, BONIFACIO BARIUS, JR., FRANCISCO BELLO and LEOPOLDO CAGATIN, respondents. G.R. No. 133750 November 29, 1999
The instant case falls within the exception. Petitioners' counsel is in guilty of gross negligence in handling their case before the trial court. Records show that petitioners' former counsel did not attend the scheduled hearing for the reception of the evidence for the defense despite due notice. The law firm did not even bother to inform its client of the scheduled hearing, as a result of which both counsel and petitioners were unable to attend the same. Worse, after the trial court issued an order declaring defendants [petitioners herein] as having waived their right to present evidence, their counsel did not take steps to have the same set aside. Although after a decision against APEX was rendered by the trial court, petitioners' counsel was able to file a timely notice of appeal. However, it failed to pay the docket fee and refused to do so despite repeated notice to pay was given by the Court of Appeals, by reason of which the appeal was dismissed. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that no action was taken by the counsel on the said dismissal, thereby allowing it to become final and executory.
Petitioners cannot be faulted in not inquiring into the records and status of the case. They expected that their counsel would amply protect their interest since they were their retained counsel which handled a majority, if not all of the cases of petitioners, including the case subject of this petition.
A client may reasonably expect that his counsel will make good his representations and has the right to expect that his lawyer will protect his interests during the trial of his case. For the general employment of an attorney to prosecute or defend a case or proceeding ordinarily vests in a plaintiff's attorney the implied authority to take all steps or do all acts necessary or incidental to the regular and orderly prosecution and management of the suit, and in a defendant's attorney, the power to take such steps as he deems necessary to defend the suit and protect the interests of the defendant.
Further, there is ample showing that petitioners' previous counsel misrepresented to the former about the true status of the damage suit filed by herein private respondents. They were made to believe, per the Progress Report submitted by the said Law Firm, that Civil Case 2131 was still pending on appeal with the Court of Appeals when in truth, the appeal has already been dismissed sixteen months ago.
The foregoing incompetence or negligence of petitioners' counsel is so great which prevented them from fairly presenting their defense as interposed in the answer that they could not be liable for damages, considering that the plaintiffs' tunnel was constructed within the claim area of the petitioners without permission, and that the award of P72,000 a day by the trial court is excessive and without basis since the tunnel's daily production was of low grade ore and was practically nil due to the hardness of the vein materials and excessive flow of water aggravated by the withdrawal of plaintiff's financier of his generator and water pumps.
If the incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to present his case. Similarly, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case as a result of his lawyer's professional delinquency or infidelity the litigation may be reopened to allow the party to present his side. Where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground.
B. VICTORIA G. CALLANGAN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,* Respondent. G.R. No. 153414 June 27, 2006
The rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client admits of exceptions. The recognized exceptions are: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property or (3) where the interests of justice so require.4 In such cases, courts must step in and accord relief to a party-litigant.5
The omissions of petitioner’s counsel amounted to an abandonment or total disregard of her case. They show conscious indifference to or utter disregard of the possible repercussions to his client. Thus, the chronic inaction of petitioner’s counsel on important incidents and stages of the criminal proceedings constituted gross negligence.
The RTC itself found that petitioner never had the chance to present her defense because of the nonfeasance (malfeasance, even) of her counsel. It also concluded that, effectively, she was without counsel.6 Considering these findings, to deprive petitioner of her liberty without affording her the right to be assisted by counsel is to deny her due process.
In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be assisted by counsel is immutable.7 Otherwise, there will be a grave denial of due process.8 The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned.9
In People v. Ferrer,10 the essence of the right to counsel was enunciated:
The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.11 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by a counsel who did not devote himself to the defense of her cause. Counsel’s utter lack of action after the prosecution rested its case revealed an extreme shortcoming on his part. Such inaction definitely proved infidelity to and abandonment of petitioner’s cause.
Considering that this case involved personal liberty, the gross negligence of counsel shocks our sense of justice. It should not be allowed to prejudice petitioner’s constitutional right to be heard.12 The Court’s pronouncement in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,13 applies strongly in this case:
The judicial conscience certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution just because the presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality. Rigid application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice where justice is due – to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime with which he or she might be charged.14
C. VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC., THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94, respondents. G.R. No. 94457 March 18, 1991
Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to exercise his utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause. 13 It is not only a case of simple negligence as found by the appellate court, but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that his client was deprived of her property without due process of law.
In People's Homesite & Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco and Escasa, 14 this Court ruled as follows:
Procedural technicality should not be made a bar to the vindication of a legitimate grievance. When such technicality deserts from being an aid to justice, the courts are justified in excepting from its operation a particular case. Where there was something fishy and suspicious about the actuations of the former counsel of petitioner in the case at bar, in that he did not given any significance at all to the processes of the court, which has proven prejudicial to the rights of said clients, under a lame and flimsy explanation that the court's processes just escaped his attention, it is held that said lawyer deprived his clients of their day in court, thus entitling said clients to petition for relief from judgment despite the lapse of the reglementary period for filing said period for filing said petition.
In Escudero vs. Judge Dulay, 15 this Court, in holding that the counsel's blunder in procedure is an exception to the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes of counsel, made the following disquisition:
Petitioners contend, through their new counsel, that the judgments rendered against them by the respondent court are null and void, because they were therein deprived of their day in court and divested of their property without due process of law, through the gross ignorance, mistake and negligence of their previous counsel. They acknowledge that, while as a rule, clients are bound by the mistake of their counsel, the rule should not be applied automatically to their case, as their trial counsel's blunder in procedure and gross ignorance of existing jurisprudence changed their cause of action and violated their substantial rights.
We are impressed with petitioner's contentions.
Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a substitute or cure for failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari (appeal) under Rule 45 of the Rules. Where, however, the application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may be relaxed.
xxx xxx xxx
While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client will suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice and equity, exceptions may be made to such rule, in accordance with the facts and circumstances of each case. Adherence to the general rule would, in the instant case, result in the outright deprivation of their property through a technicality.
In its questioned decision dated November 19, 1989 the Court of Appeals found, in no uncertain terms, the negligence of the then counsel for petitioner when he failed to file the proper motion to dismiss or to draw a compromise agreement if it was true that they agreed on a settlement of the case; or in simply filing an answer; and that after having been furnished a copy of the decision by the court he failed to appeal therefrom or to file a petition for relief from the order declaring petitioner in default. In all these instances the appellate court found said counsel negligent but his acts were held to bind his client, petitioner herein, nevertheless.
The Court disagrees and finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross and inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel another chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment of the judgment in the appellate court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that after he received a copy of the adverse judgment of the appellate court, he did not do anything to save the situation or inform his client of the judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and become final. Such reckless and gross negligence should not be allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.